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ABSTRACT

As global commerce continues to expand, many states find
international trade agreements to be a useful tool to facilitate
this continued expansion. Trade agreements permit developing
or poorer nations to establish robust, mutually beneficial trade
relationships with powerful economies such as the United
States. In the face of regional competition from China, several
nations bordering the Pacific Ocean, including the United
States, have reached a far-reaching trade agreement called the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This Note will focus on one
particularpiece of the TPP: the pharmaceutical trade and the
internationalavailability of generic medicines. The TPP has the
potential to dramatically alter intellectual property laws in the
signatory nations and may have a disruptive effect on the
availability of generic pharmaceuticals worldwide. This Note
analyzes the potential for this problem and proposes an
alternative mechanism in which signatory nations are granted
automatic licenses for certain medicines they deem essential.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the United States entered into negotiations with Chile,
New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei for a proposed free trade
agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 Since then,
the agreement has expanded to include several other nations with a
significant trade presence in the Pacific region, including Australia,
Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. 2 A final
agreement was reached on October 5, 2015, making the TPP one of
3
the largest trade agreements in the world.
The goal of this trade agreement was to expand industry in
developing Pacific nations and stimulate trade between all signatory
nations. 4 Many commentators have viewed this trade agreement as a
strategic move to counter-balance China's influence in the Pacific
region. 5 Negotiations for the TPP occurred privately, with the
contents being accessible only to each nation's trade representatives

1.
NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, TRANS-PACIFIC
STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE P4-THE
ORIGINAL P4 AGREEMENT (2012), http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-EconomicRelations/2 -Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/0- history.php [http://pe
rma.cc/UL37-9CYN] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
2.
IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP (TPP) NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2014) [hereinafter
FERGUSSON, TPP].
Jackie Calmes, Trans-PacificPartnershipIs Reached, but Faces Scrutiny
3.
in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/
business/trans pacific partnership-trade-deal-is -reached.html [http://perma.cc/B5GNL9TF] (archived Oct.23, 2015); FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2.
4.
Calmes, supra note 3, at 2.
5.
Lydia DePilis, Everything You Need to Know About the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonk
blog/wp/2013/12/1 1/everything-you- need-to- know- about-the-trans-pacific-partnership
[http://perma.cc/DZ57-HUX8] (archived Feb. 26, 2015); Alex Frangos, Interest Builds in
Pacific Trade Zone, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB100O1424052748704011904575538003964028436?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405274870401190457553800396
40 28436.html [http://perma.cc/NH4P-9S9K] (archived Feb.26, 2015); Jane Kelsey, The
Trans-PacificPartnershipas a Lynchpin of US Anti- China Strategy, FOREIGN CONTROL
WATCHDOG (Dec. 2011), http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/28/06.htm [http://perma.
cc/H23T-R238] (archived Feb. 26, 2015); Mireya Solis, The Containment Fallacy: China
and the TPP, BROOKINGS (May 24, 2013), http://www.brookings.edufblogs/up[http://perma.cc/KPM9-XF8
front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis
Q] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
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and their advisors. 6 In the fall of 2013, the anti-secrecy organization
WikiLeaks first leaked a negotiator's draft of the Intellectual
Property Rights Chapter of the TPP. 7 In October of 2014, it leaked a
new version of this chapter that was purported to be current as of
May of that year. 8 Finally, on October 9, 2015, just four days after the
final agreement was reached, WikiLeaks released what it claimed
was the final Intellectual Property Rights Chapter. 9 The final official
text was released to the public on January 26, 2016, revealing the
accuracy of the final leaked version. 10 The leaked documents revealed
the contentious nature of this agreement, particularly with regard to
its intellectual property (IP) provisions. 11 In total, the leaked
documents demonstrated at least nineteen points of disagreement
between the United States and the other parties during the
12
negotiations of the TPP's IP provisions.
While the TPP's IP provisions largely track existing U.S. IP law,
the final provisions expand upon it in several key areas. 13
Additionally, the TPP raises existing global standards created by the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

DePilis, supra note 5.
6.
7.
Id.
8.
Secret Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement (TPP): Intellectual Property
TPP Leak 1],
(Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter
Rights Chapter, WIKILEAKS
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/ [http://perma.c/EPB3-QNMG] (archived Oct. 23, 2015);
Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Intellectual Property Chapter Working
Document for All 12 Nations with Negotiating Positions, WIKILEAKS [hereinafter TPP
Leak 2], https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/ [https://perma.cc/LH4S-D93T] (archived Feb. 26,
2015).
Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement (TPP): Intellectual Property Rights
9.
Chapter, Consolidated Text, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 5, 2015) [hereinafter TPP Leak 3],
https:H/wikileaks.org/tpp-ip3/ [https://perma.cc/W5MK-XLY8] (archived Oct. 23, 2015).
10.
NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) (2015), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-process/
trans-pacific-partnership-tpp [perma.cc/AD2U-GSBB] (archived Feb. 1, 2016); M.
Ryder Lee, When Wikileaks Works: Comparing the Leaked Draft of the IP Section of the
TPP to the Official USTR Text and the Consequences to Termination Rights in
http:/www.
"Phonograms" BUTLER SNOW: BIZLITNEWS (Dec. 15, 2015),
butlersnow.com/2015/12/when-wikileaks -works-comparing-the -leaked-draft- of- the-ipsection-of-the-tpp to-the-official-ustr-text- and-the-consequences-to-termination-rightsin-phonograms/ [perma.cc/3XSP-HDRD] (archived Feb. 1, 2016); Drew Wilson, TPP
Text: Wikileaks Version Compared to Official Version, FREEZENET (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.freezenet.ca/tpp-text-wikileaks-version-compared-to-official-version/,
[https://perma.cc/EU6C-2U9Z] (archived Feb. 1, 2016); see also Krista Hughes, US
Hopes to Release TPP Trade Deal Text in 30 Days: Michael Froman, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/us-hopes-release-tpp-trade-deal-text-30-daysmichael-froman-2136072 [http://perma.cc/VSF5-9U9W] (archived Oct. 23, 2015).
Emma Woollacott, US Fails to Close TPP Deal as Wikileaks Exposes
11.
Discord, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2013/12/
10/us -fails-to-close-tpp- deal-as-wikileaks-exposes-discord/ [http://perma.cc/A44E-94GT]
(archived Oct. 23, 2015).
Id.
12.
DePilis, supra note 5.
13.
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(TRIPS). 14 The IP areas most affected are copyrights, patents, and IP
enforcement. 15
One notable change in the IP realm involves the patentability of
generic pharmaceuticals. 16 The TPP expands patentability of
pharmaceutical products and permits their patent terms to be
lengthened by up to five years. 17 This change will potentially reduce
the availability of cheap generic medicines or increase the price of
18
available medicines in the signatory nations.
The IP enforcement regimes have also likely changed for many
nations involved. 19 Member states have to bring their enforcement
regimes in line with that of the United States, which mandates stiffer
20
penalties for infringement, including criminal penalties.
Proponents of the deal have pointed to the economic benefits that
the agreement is predicted to bring to member nations. 2 1 In addition
to denouncing the overall lack of transparency in negotiations, critics
have expressed concern with the IP provisions, noting that the lion's
share of the anticipated benefits will go to patent and copyright
holders, resulting in greater restrictions on the public's freedom to
22
access and use knowledge.
Part II of this Note will describe the development of the TPP,
focusing on the influential role that the United States played during
negotiations. This Part will also discuss the main points of contention
among signatories, describing the way this new treaty modifies the
current state of global intellectual property law.
Part III will analyze the projected effects of the TPP on the
international pharmaceutical trade, focusing in particular on the
likelihood that many citizens of Pacific nations will see dramatic,
sometimes prohibitive, increases in the prices for prescription drugs.
As a result of the increased protections offered to pharmaceutical
patent-holders, nations that currently provide cheap pharmaceuticals
as part of their national healthcare plans may see generics become
more expensive or harder to procure. In analyzing this change in

14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, arts. QQ.E.1, .12, .16.
18.
DePilis, supra note 5 (explaining that the TPP would "make the approval
process more difficult for generic drug makers and extend protections for biologic
medicines.").
19.
See FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 29.
20.
Id. at 29-30.
21.
Id. at 3 (suggesting that the TPP would bring comprehensive market
access, regional agreement that facilitates trade, regulatory coherence, and a flexible
approach to emerging trade issues).
22.
James Love, New Leak of TPP Consolidated Text on Intellectual Property
Provides Details of Pandering to Drug Companies and Publishers, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY
INT'L (Oct.
16,
2014,
5:03 PM),
http://keionline.org/node/2108
[http://perma.cc/PLK4-V4W9] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
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price and availability, this Note will analyze the effects that the
TPP's changes will have on consumers in general, as well as focus on
the varying ways that different nations will be affected. This Note
will also compare the current state of U.S. intellectual property law to
the IP laws of other nations and to the recommendations set forth by
the TRIPS agreement. In comparing the various regimes, this Note
will analyze some of the conflicts that the proposed changes will have
with the current laws of the involved nations.
Finally, Part IV will propose an alternative version of the IP
provisions that would expressly permit nations to distribute generic
pharmaceuticals without fear of an infringement suit. This
alternative provision would permit signatory nations to use their
discretion and devise national "essential medicines" lists. Each
signatory would have the discretion to grant compulsory licenses for
pharmaceutical products found on that nation's list. This change
would permit private or public entities within each state to devise
generic alternatives to essential medicines that may then be cheaply
distributed within that nation. In return, the pharmaceutical pioneer
that invented the original medicine would receive a royalty as
compensation for his or her research and development costs. This
Note will provide details regarding how this royalty may appear, and
will discuss whether and how this plan could be implemented, and
the medical and monetary ramifications such a plan might have for
signatory nations and pharmaceutical companies.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The TPP is a long-negotiated free trade agreement between
twelve nations that border the Pacific Ocean, including the United
States. 23 Once fully implemented, this will be the largest trade
agreement in the world by trade-flow, affecting 40 percent of the
world's GDP and 26 percent of the world's trade. 2 4 This Part will
describe the events that led to the development of the TPP, focusing
primarily on the United States' role, and will discuss the major points
of contention among signatories.
A. Inception and Development of the TPP
The seeds for the Trans-Pacific Partnership were planted in 2002
when representatives of Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand entered
into side negotiations while attending the Asia Pacific Economic

23.
24.

DePilis, supra note 5.
Id.
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Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. 2 5 Their
shared goal was to devise an agreement that would liberalize trade
across the Pacific Ocean in order to foster economic development in
each of the three nations. 26 By 2005, Brunei Darussalam had entered
into talks with the original three parties, and on June 3, 2005, the
"P4" nations announced that they had signed a trade pact. 27 The
trade pact was called the Trans-Pacific , Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement, or Trans-Pacific SEP, and represented the
P4 nations' shared vision for a future trade expansion in the AsiaPacific region. 28 Pursuant to the agreement, each party promised to
eliminate trade barriers and facilitate the movement of goods among
signatories, to promote fair competition, to increase investment
opportunities in each party's territory, to establish a cooperative
approach to IP rights, and to create an effective mechanism for
resolving trade disputes. 29 In addition, this agreement affirmed the
parties' commitment to encourage other nations to join the
negotiations. 30 These original tenets of the Trans-Pacific SEP laid the
foundation for the expansive set of multi-party negotiations known as
31
the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
In January 2008, Susan Schwab, the U.S. Trade Representative
at the time, announced plans for the United States to commence
trade negotiations with the P4, suggesting it might join the actual
Trans-Pacific SEP trade pact. 3 2 The introduction of the United States
as a negotiating partner enticed several other Pacific nations to join
subsequent rounds of negotiations. 33 According to David Skilling, the
chief executive of the New Zealand Institute, the addition of an
economic heavyweight like the United States gave the relatively
small economies of the P4 members a seat at the global negotiating
table. 34 Subsequently, the combined negotiating team of the P4 and

25.
Joint Press Statement, Ministers of Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New
Zealand, and Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore
Conclude Negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement
(June 3, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20060907090445[http://www.mfat.govt.nz/
tradeagreements/transpacepa/transpacseppress.html
[http://perma.cc/22RB-YRCK]
(archived Feb. 26, 2015).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.; Chris Daniels, First Step to Wider Free Trade, N.Z. HERALD (Feb. 10,
2008), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c-id=3&objectid=10491556
[http://perma.cc/MYR9-V38T] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
29.
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement art. 1.1, 2005,
http://www.rnfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/X8S5-2CNW] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
30.
Id. Preamble.
31.
Id. art. 1.1.
32.
Daniels, supra note 28.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
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the United States, now referred to as the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
began to invite other nations to join them in trade talks. 35 In 2008,
the P4 invited Australia, Peru, and Vietnam to a round of trade talks
36
that would commence in March of 2009 in Singapore.
Over the next few years, several more parties joined the TPP,
many of which began to view the TPP as an opportunity to
strategically counter-balance China's growing economic influence in
the Pacific. 3 7 Malaysia joined talks in October of 2010, Canada and
Mexico joined in October of 2012, and Japan joined in March of
2013.38 While several other nations, including Thailand and South
Korea, considered joining, the final negotiating consortium included
twelve countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the United States, and
Vietnam. 39 The combined population of these twelve nations is
almost 800 million people, 40 and their combined GDP comprises
approximately 40 percent of the world's total GDP. 41 Once
implemented, the TPP will be the largest free trade agreement,
measured by trade flow, that the United States has ever entered
42
into.

35.
Id.
Ray Brindal, Australia to Join Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc, ALIBABA (Nov. 27,
36.
2008), http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/asia/100025812- 1-australia-join-trans-paci
fic-partnership-trade.html [http://perma.cc[PGF6-5T6V] (archived February 26, 2015).
37.
DePilis, supra note 5: Frangos, supra note 5; Kelsey, supra note 5; Solis,
supra note 5.
38.
NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, TRANS-PACIFIC
TPP
TALK
(2012),
PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT:
STRATEGIC
ECONOMIC
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and[http://perma.cd/
Agreements/Trans-Pacific/ 1-TPP-Talk/0-TPP-talk- 10a-Oct-2012.php
444R-ZFGV] (archived Feb. 26, 2015); IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) NEGOTIATIONS 3 (2015); Press
Release, Tim Groser, Mexico Joins Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations (June 19,
2012), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/mexico-joins-trans-pacific-partnership-negoti
ations [http://perma.cc/X6S9-6LKK] (archived Feb. 26, 2015); Joshua Meltzer, Japan to
Join the Trans-PacificPartnership-Finally!,BROOKINGS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.
brookings. edulblogs/up-front/posts/2013/03/18-japan-joins -trans-pacific-partnership
meltzer [http://perma.cc/Q7G8-5BVK] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
39.
Meltzer, supra note 38; TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, at 1.
40.
Scott Harris, The TPP Is Coming to Canada (Not That It's Easy to Tell),
COUNCIL CANADIANS (June 25, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://canadians.org/blog/tpp-comingcanada-not-its-easy-tell [http://perma.cc/SCT8-FZWS] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
41.
Jacqui Fatka, Tide Changing on TPP Negotiations, FARM FUTURES (Dec.
[http://
26, 2014), http://farmfutures.comlblogs-tide-changing-tpp-negotiations-9315
perma.cc/MAB7-J2SL] (archived Feb. 26, 2015); Yoko Nishiwaka, South Korea Mulling
U.S.-Led TPP Trade Initiative: Report, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2010), http:/Iwww.
reuters.com/article/2010/11/14/us-apec-korea-idUSTRE6AD05L20101114 [http://perma.
cc/2P7M-XTX9] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
42.
Harris, supra note 40; see FERGUSSON, TPP, supranote 2, at 54.
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B. ConfidentialNegotiations, Missed Deadlines,and the United
States' Response
Following the TPP's inception, the parties met more than twenty
times to negotiate terms. 43 Each party sent trade representatives
strict confidence
during
who were required to maintain
negotiations. 4 4 According to the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), which represented the United States, each
nation signed a confidentiality agreement "reflecting the customary
understanding between countries engaged in trade negotiations that
the negotiations should be carried out in private." 45 Consequently,
following each round of talks, very little information was disclosed to
46
the general public.
While the involved parties did not freely provide the public with
specific updates following each round of talks, there were limited
opportunities for public input into the process. The USTR solicited
public input from "interested individuals, organizations, and
businesses before entering into the talks," as well as from "scores of
individual advisors from outside government who serve as members
of the Administration's many trade-advisory committees." 47 Critics of
the lack of transparency in the negotiation process have interpreted
the phrase "interested individuals, organizations, and businesses" to
48
mean lobbyists and other influential corporate entities.
The general procedure at each of these rounds involved the
United States' representative circulating a proposal on which each of
the other representatives would make notes in the hope of deriving a
consensus. 49 Following each round, the trade representatives
consulted with advisors in order to further narrow down provisions,
before returning to the next round of talks, which were usually held
50
weeks or months apart.

43.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT CANADA: FREE TRADE
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade -agreements-accords-com
AGREEMENTS
(2015),
[http://perma.cc/68MX-A5JK]
merciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/rounds-series.aspx?lang-eng
(archived Feb. 26, 2015).
44.
Id.
45.
OFFICE OF THE UNITES STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT-SHEET: THE
UNITED STATES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: INCREASING AMERICAN EXPORTS,
SUPPORTING AMERICAN JOBS (2012) [hereinafter FACT-SHEET], https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/june/transparency-and-the-tpp [https://per
ma.cc/DY7R-2CL6] (archived Mar. 3, 2015).
46.
DePilis, supra note 5 ("[T]alks, as with all trade agreements, have been
conducted largely in secret."); Harris, supra note 40 ("[T]he talks have been largely
shrouded in secrecy.").
47.
FACT-SHEET, supra note 45.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
Id.
50.
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Despite multiple predictions that the TPP parties would reach a
finalized agreement at various proposed deadlines, a consensus was
not reached until October of 2015.51 For example, after the round of
talks that took place in Washington, DC, in December of 2014, Darci
Vetter, the chief agricultural negotiator for the USTR, indicated that
negotiations were "entering the end game," identifying several
specific provisions as the final remaining unsettled points, including
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, intellectual property, and tariff
negotiations. 52 By that point, several previously looming obstacles
had already dissipated, such as the United States' approach to
tobacco trade-a sticking point for Australia, who had recently passed
strict tobacco sale legislation-as well as Japan's reluctance to come
to terms with the United States on an agreeable automobile tariff
53
policy.
C. Points of Contention Among Signatories
Despite the secrecy of the negotiations, multiple leaks about the
negotiations gave the public insight into the various disputed
negotiating points. 5 4 The final agreed-upon TPP document contained
thirty chapters, including topics such as Market Access, Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards, Investment, Rules of Origin, Business
Facilitation and Competition, Trade Remedies, and Intellectual
55
Property Rights.
Some of the more contentious topics were intellectual property,
the protocol for dealing with enterprises that are currently stateowned, market access and tariffs, investor-state dispute resolution,
and tobacco trade. 5 6 Because the United States was negotiating from
the standpoint of increased competition, some governments that
owned sizeable sectors of their national economies struggled to come
to terms with demands made by the United States that they began to
limit their public support for those sectors. 5 7 In addition, while the
parties negotiated dropping all tariffs between member states, the

51.
Id.; Calmes, supra note 3, at 1.
Keith Good, AgriTalk (Dec. 14, 2014), http://farmpolicy.com/wp-content/
52.
(archived
uploads/2014/12/AgriTalk14Decl6Trade.pdf [http://perma.cc/6XRL-XVV9]
Feb. 26, 2015).
53.
Id.
54.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

THE TRANS-

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, https://ustr.gov/tpp/#text [perma.cc/R35E-V2S3] (archived Feb.
2, 2016); Woollacott, supra note 11; see FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 40-41.
55.
Good, supra note 52.
56.
DePilis, supra note 5.
57.
Id. (citing Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia, specifically).
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United States and Japan struggled to come to an agreement over
58
agricultural and automobile tariffs between their two nations.
Among the contentious issues that arose during negotiations,
perhaps the most contentious was the issue of intellectual property
rights. 59 WikiLeaks has, on three separate occasions, leaked
negotiators' copies of the intellectual property chapter. 60 The first
leak occurred in November 2013 and the second in October 2014.61
The later leak included documents taken from the twentieth round of
negotiations, which were held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, in May
2014.62 Unlike the final document that was leaked in October 2015,
these first two drafts contained negotiators' notes regarding specific
propositions and the positions each party had taken on various
issues, ultimately revealing at least nineteen major points of
disagreement, largely between the United States and the other
63
parties.
To begin, the TPP is considered to be a "TRIPS Plus"
agreement. 64 TRIPS is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, which has, since 1996, defined the
global minimum set of intellectual property requirements as
established by the World Trade Organization. 65 The TPP is based
upon TRIPS but expands on it in several key areas.
Based on the leaked negotiator drafts, the United States
appeared to have been the driving force in seeking to expand
intellectual property rights and protections among its negotiating
partners. 66 One of the major proposed changes involved establishing

Asahi Shimbun, Japan Compromising on U.S. Auto Tariffs for TPP
58.
Negotiations, JAPANESE L. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2013), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/business/
AJ201303050069 [https:H/perma.cc/6Y83-F7KD] (archived Mar. 3, 2016).
59.
See FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 19.
60.
TPP Leak 1, supra note 8; TPP Leak 2, supra note 8; TPP Leak 3, supra
note 9.
61.
TPP Leak 1, supra note 8; TPP Leak 2, supra note 8.
62.
TPP Leak 1, supra note 8; TPP Leak 2, supra note 8.
63.
See generally TPP Leak 2, supra note 8 (exposing the contents of a
confidential draft treaty describing how Intellectual Property would be handled under
the TPP); see also Woollacott supra note 11 (explaining that the WikiLeaks exposed
major discord between TPP parties).
64.
Amer Raja, Trans-Pacific Partnership Discussion on TRIPS-Plus
Standards,AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.ipbrief.net/2011/11/
17/trans-pacific-partnership-discussion-on-trips-plus-standards/ [https://perma.cc/4RX
7-ZD6X] (archived Feb. 12, 2016); see also Trips, Trips Plus, and Doha, MEDECINS SANS
FRONTIERES (July 2011), http://www.msfaccess.org/content/trips-trips-plus-and-doha
[https:H/perma.cc/LMN5-AUUT] (archived Feb. 12, 2016) (describing how TRIPS plus
provisions require tougher patent laws).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
65.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, art. 1 [hereinafter TRIPS].
66.
See FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 29 (explaining how the U.S. has
sought increased intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in its FTAs).
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a new minimum copyright term for signatories. 6 7 Currently, the
TRIPS Agreement mandates a minimum copyright period of fifty
years from the death of the author. 68 The United States sought to
extend this protection to at least match the copyright period shared
by the United States, Peru, and Chile, which is seventy years after
the death of the author. The documents indicated that the figure of
one hundred years from the death of the author (the copyright term
in Mexico) had also come up in talks. 69 The final leaked document
indicated that the final, agreed-upon term would, in fact, be life plus
seventy years; this means that signatories, such as Japan, Malaysia,
and New Zealand, that currently operate under a life plus fifty years
regime will have to lengthen their terms accordingly.70
In addition, the United States successfully sought not only to
prohibit the removal or alteration of Digital Rights Management
(DRM) from copyrighted data but also to require signatories to adopt
criminal penalties for such behaviors. 71 The United States also
successfully lobbied for a provision that would require Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) to aggressively monitor their customers for
potentially infringing activity such as piracy, although it was unable
to establish a regime that would hold ISPs liable for copyright
infringing activity that occurred on their systems without their
participation. 72 Controversially, the United States wanted to include
provisions that would require certain types of copyright infringement
to be incorporated into the criminal codes of signatory nations.
Ultimately, criminal classifications for infringement were limited to
73
those occurring "on a commercial scale."
The leaked negotiator texts also revealed how some nations
74
resisted the implementation of U.S.-style copyright protections.
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore all expressed objections to the
United States' draft of criminal copyright enforcement, seeking to

67.
See TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, art. QQ.G.6 (demonstrating disagreements
between different countries over what the minimum copyright term should be).
68.
TRIPS, supra note 65, Part. II, § 1, art. 12.
69.
See FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 29; TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, art.
QQ.G.6; see also Balfour Smith, World Copyright Terms, PUB. DOMAIN DAY,
http://www.publicdomainday.org/node/39 [https://perma.cc/RWF6-A7Q9] (archived Feb.
13, 2016) (demonstrating the length of standard copyright in different countries).
70.
TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art. QQ.G.6; Smith, supra note 69.
See TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art. QQ.G.13(a) (describing actions that
71.
constituted violations).
72.
TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, art. QQ.G.10(a)(ii); see also TPP Leak 3, supra
note 9, art. QQ.H.1l(I) (describing the obligations of each signatory's government).
73.
TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, art. QQ.H.7; TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art.
QQ.H.7.
74.
See generally TPP Leak 1, supra note 8 (describing various instances in
which many countries opposed proposals made by the United States); see also TPP
Leak 2, supra note 8 (describing various points of disagreements between the United
States and other nations).
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replace it with text based on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA).7 5 Both options were stricter than the provisions
included in the TRIPS agreement, but the ACTA provisions, which
more closely resembled the provisions in the final TPP draft, were far
less rigid and provided nations with greater flexibility in enforcing IP
laws. 76 For example, the United States favored criminal penalties for
willful trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and piracy, regardless
of whether the infringement results in a financial gain. 77 ACTA,
however, only requires criminal penalties for infringements that
result in financial gain. 78 Online piracy, or file sharing, are major
examples of a behavior that would have been subject to criminal
penalties under the proposed U.S. regime but are not under the
adopted ACTA-style regime. Because file sharers do not typically gain
financially when illegally download pirated data, their treatment, and
potentially the treatment of their Internet Service Provider, would
have been remarkably different had the United States been
successful in its proposal.
An additional point of contention regarding proposed IP
provisions lay in the realm of patents. 79 The United States sought to
expand the definition of patentability beyond what was included in
the TRIPS Agreement, which makes patents available "for any
invention, whether product or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are
capable of industrial application." 80 Put simply, the TRIPS
Agreement requires novelty, an inventive step (referred to as nonobviousness in the United States), and utility. The United States
sought to relax those patentability standards, permitting the
patenting of plants and animals, medical methods, as well as new
forms, uses, or methods of an existing product without enhanced
efficacy.81 This is referred to as "evergreening," which permits a
patent-holder to effectively extend their patent term over and over
again by making subtle changes that would not normally satisfy the
novelty or inventive step requirement. 82 Under both the TRIPS
Agreement regime and current U.S. patent law, evergreening is not
83
permissible.

75.
FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 30.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 30-31.
79.
Id. at 30.
80.
TRIPS, supra note 65, art. 27.
81.
Krista Cox, Evolving Patent Issues and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Oct. 15, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1813 [http://
perma.cc/V648-LC24] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
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Another contentious patent issue was the presumption of
validity.8 4 In the United States, if a patent is granted by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), that patent is
presumed to be valid in any subsequent litigation, and the burden of
proof is on any accused infringer to demonstrate that the patent office
mistakenly granted the patent. 85 The USPTO released data
indicating that 78 percent of all granted U.S. patents contained
86
problematic claims that either needed to be amended or canceled.
Not all TPP signatories have such a lax system for granting patents,
and the fact that the United States was able to export a regime in
which patents would be granted easily and would be costly to
challenge will likely present a tremendous burden for foreign entities
accused of infringement.

III. ANALYSIS
Some scholars, including the economist Joseph Stiglitz, have
considered the TPP to be an unnecessary expansion of the TRIPS
Agreement. 8 7 Many of these scholars view the lack of transparency in
negotiations and the influence that pharmaceutical advisors have had
as evidence that the TPP was designed specifically to benefit medical
patent-holders, rather than the ultimate recipients of those
medicines. 88 This Part will analyze these assertions, first by
discussing some of the major changes that the TPP made to the
TRIPS Agreement and how those will affect the trade of
pharmaceutical goods among signatory nations. Next, this Part will
analyze the effect that this change will have on the current medical
regimes in signatory nations. This Part ultimately concludes that the
TPP was indeed designed to benefit producers of medicines, rather
than consumers, and that the trade of generic medicine will suffer
dramatically.
The availability of cheap medicines will decrease globally, and
pharmaceutical prices will increase. The result is that citizens in the
poorer, developing signatory nations will not see increased access to
health care commensurate with the proposed increase in economic

84.
See id. (explaining that the United States wants granted patents to receive
a presumption of validity).
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
See Letter from Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia Bus. Sch., to Barack Obama,
President of the United States (Dec. 6, 2013), http://keionline.org/sites/default/
files/jstiglitzTPP.pdf [http://perma.ccIAPY2-XDJQ] (archived Feb. 26, 2015) (arguing
that a TRIPS minus agreement would be more beneficial).
88.
Id.
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stature.89 In addition, citizens of nations that currently provide
access to generics through their national healthcare systems may see
90
prices go up and availability go down.
This Part will first describe the ways in which the TPP expands
upon the TRIPS agreement and will analyze the effects that
expansion will have on the status of international IP laws. This Part
will then discuss the governmental mechanisms found in India that
serve as an alternative example to the TPP's mechanism for
regulating generic pharmaceutical products.
A. The Proposed TPP as a "TRIPS Plus"Regime
Before the United States entered into the TRIPS Agreement,
patents filed before June 8, 1995, received protection for seventeen
years after the filing date. 9 1 For any patent filed on or after that date,
the patentee would receive protection for twenty years after the filing
date. 92 When a major pharmaceutical company, often referred to as a
"pioneer drug manufacturer," applies for an initial patent, the clock
starts ticking on its twenty-year protection period as soon as the
application is filed, even though the company has not even begun the
93
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)'s required approval process.
Consequently, the patent term for new pharmaceutical products has
almost always run for several years-sometimes the majority of the
patent period-before the drug can be legally sold to the general
public. Pioneer drug manufacturers will invest time and potentially
billions of dollars in developing what they hope will be a "blockbuster"
pharmaceutical product. By the time the product has passed through
the necessary testing and gained approval from the FDA, it is likely
that years have gone by, meaning their effective patent term may be
closer to a dozen or fewer years, rather than the nearly twenty that
most other types of manufacturers receive.

89.
See Press Release, Public Health Association, Protecting the Health of
Australians in the TPPA (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.scoop.co.nz/storiesWO1402/SOO
215/protecting-the-health-of-australians-in-the-tppa.htm
[http://perma.cc/RU67-Z58H]
(archived Feb. 26, 2015) (explaining how increased medicine costs will
disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups).
90.
Id.
91.
Dennis Crouch, Patent Term: Comparing 17-Years-from-Issue to 20-Yearsfrom-Filing, PATENTLYO (Dec. 12, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/one-ofthe-most-important-attributes-of-a-patent-is-its-term-or-duration-of- enforceability-in1995-the-us-patent-system-beg.html [https://perma.cc/QS9R- 3CAP] (archived Feb. 13,
2016).
92.
Id.; TRIPS, supra note 65, art. 33.
93.
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015); see also FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic
Drugs, FDA (Aug. 2002), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/Bioterror
ismandDrugPreparedness/ucm134444.htm
[https://perma.cc/N4T6-LNC4]
(archived
Feb. 13, 2016).
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At the same time, the United States has a legal regime designed
to facilitate the entry of generic drugs onto the market. 94 The Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, or HatchWaxman Act, set the stage for the manner in which generic drug
manufacturers may gain permission to begin selling a generic version
95
of a drug within the pioneer drug manufacturer's patent period.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer may apply for
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which, if granted,
gives them approval to manufacture a therapeutically equivalent
version of a patented drug. 96 These applications are "abbreviated"
because they do not have to include clinical data, as the safety of the
medication has already been established by the pioneer drug
manufacturer. 97 Generic manufacturers are able to offer medications
at a much lower price than the pioneer drug manufacturer because
they do not have to spend money on research and development,
whereas the pioneer drug manufacturer will often charge much
higher prices for an equivalent product to recoup the tremendous cost
of developing the product. In order to reconcile these two regimes and
continue to incentivize the production of both expensive pioneer
pharmaceuticals and cheap generics, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows
the pioneer patentee to apply for an additional five years of patent
protection once a generic version of their product is approved for
98
sale.
Another component of the Hatch-Waxman Act is an incentive for
generic manufacturers to challenge pharmaceutical patents they feel
are weak or invalid. 9 9 An interesting corollary effect of this provision
is what is referred to as "reverse settlement agreements." Reverse
settlement agreements are out-of-court settlements that occur in
anticipation of litigation. 10 0 In the patent realm, settlements usually
occur when a patent infringer pays the patent holder to not continue
with an infringement claim. In contrast, reverse settlements occur
when a pioneer drug manufacturer, threatened with an invalidity
suit by a generic manufacturer, settles out of court, paying that
generic manufacturer to not challenge their presumed-valid patent,

94.
See generally The Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (explaining lawful
methods of introducing drugs into interstate commerce).
95.
Id. § 355(j).
96.
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv)
97.
See id. at 40 (explaining that 'labeling changes merely incorporated
clinical data.").
See id. at 61 (discussing "five-year exclusive marketing period following
98.
approval of new drug application.").
99.
Cox, supra note 81.
100.
See id. (suggesting that reverse settlement agreements are essentially
"pay-for-delay" agreements).
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essentially removing them from the competitive marketplace.101
Reverse settlement agreements raise major antitrust concerns, and
some cases have actually reached the Supreme Court on antitrust
challenges. 10 2 So far, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has not found
10 3
them presumptively illegal.
By importing the United States' presumptive validity system for
pharmaceutical patents into the TPP, several troubling changes will
occur globally in relation to the availability of generic medicines.
After TRIPS passed, the twenty-year patent period became the norm
for most of the world. 10 4 However, not every other TRIPS signatory
nation permitted a five-year extension for pharmaceuticals like the
United States did. The United States sought to include the five-year
extension option into the TPP, which resulted in some disagreement
among the other parties. 10 5 The adoption of the U.S. system for
generics entering the market may also present an additional obstacle,
as it has left room for reverse settlement agreements to occur. If the
ability to enter into reverse settlement agreements were to become
available internationally, powerful global pharmaceuticals could
potentially pay regional competitors to abstain from challenging their
patents. This would allow major pharmaceuticals to further entrench
their dominance in the global market, as they would now be able to
pay generic medicine manufacturers to not attempt to market or
If powerful
versions of their products.
produce generic
pharmaceutical companies were able to pay small generic
manufacturers to not produce competing products, the global
availability of cheap generics could suffer immensely.
Another troubling change that the TPP contained was the ability
to evergreen. Evergreening allows a patentee's monopoly to last much
longer, perhaps even indefinitely, which delays the entry of generics
into the market.106 For instance, if a drug patent included a specific
delivery method, but a new method is later discovered within the
patent period, the patentee could reapply for a new patent on the
basis that the new delivery method was novel. 107 This issue is
exacerbated by the ability to keep pharmaceutical data secret for a

101.
See id. (explaining how reverse settlement agreements result "in branded
pharmaceutical companies paying for generic companies not to continue on the merits
of the case").
102.
See id. (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Actavis).
103.
See id. ("Mhe Supreme Court did not rule pay-for-delay agreements to be
presumptively illegal.").
104.
TRIPS, supra note 65, art. 33.
TPP Leak 2, supra note 8, art. QQ.E. 12.
105.
106.
See Margaret Flowers, Trans-Pacific Partnership Undermines Health
System, ALJAZEERA (June 17, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.comlindepth/opinion/2013/06/
201361711230432720.html [http://perma.cc/R9JE-RRME] (archived Feb. 26, 2015)
(expressing concern over how evergreening may be manipulated).
Id.
107.
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period of time, preventing generic competitors from developing
analogous compounds.
Both the TRIPS Agreement and current U.S. domestic patent
law prohibit patent evergreening. 10 8 However, the final draft of the
TPP required each signatory to make "an adjustment" available to
pharmaceutical patent terms when the pharmaceutical product was
subject to an "unreasonable curtailment" of the patent term due to
the marketing approval process.109
The TPP also permits an alternate method that could have a
similar evergreening effect. 110 This method involves permitting
pharmaceutical companies to withhold their data from the public for
a certain period of time. By permitting pharmaceutical companies to
maintain an embargo on their experimental data, the timeline during
which generic competitors could access the data and formulate
biosimilar compounds is delayed. 11 1 President Obama's 2014 budget
proposal indicated his intention to accelerate access to generic
alternatives within the United States: "[b]eginning in 2014, this
proposal should award brand biologic manufacturers seven years of
exclusivity, rather than twelve years under current law, and prohibit
additional periods of exclusivity for brand biologics due to minor
changes in product formulations, a practice often referred to as
evergreening."' 112 Despite the President's indication that he planned
to combat domestic attempts at evergreening, the leaked negotiator
drafts indicated that the United States sought to incorporate a
twelve-year protection period for biologics. 113 The final version of the
TPP incorporated a U.S.-backed provision that would require
exclusive rights over experimental data for a period of at least five
114
years from the date of first pharmaceutical marketing approval.
for
the
five-year
embargo
permitted
In
addition
to
pharmaceutical products in general, the final draft of the TPP also
required signatories to adopt a minimum exclusivity period of eight
years for pharmaceutical data specifically related to biologic

Cox, supra note 81.
108.
109.
TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art. QQ.E. 14.2.
110.
Third World Network, What's New in the TPP Intellectual Property Text?
PharmaceuticalProvisions, PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 9, 2015), at 6, https://wikileaks.org/tppip3/pharmaceutical/Pharmaceutical%20Provisions%20in%20the%20TPP.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/SH9P-74FB] (archived Feb. 13, 2016).
111.
Jessi Canny, Ratifying the TPP May Be Tough, but Australia Needs It,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 6, 2015), https://theconversation.com/ratifying-the-tpp-may-betough-but- australia -needs -it-48663 fhttps://perma.cc/8HAA-XPBF] (archived Feb. 13,
2016); Cox, supra note 81
112.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, 40 (2013).
113.
See Canny, supra note 111 (discussing Australia's disagreement with the
United States over the twelve-year protection period).
114.
TPP Leak 3, supranote 9, art. QQ.E.16.1.a.
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compounds. 115 Parties were also required to provide one of two
potential biologic-evergreening models, one of which granted a
minimum of an additional three years of data exclusivity for new
indications, formulations, or methods of administering the biologic;
the other model would grant at least five extra years of data
116
exclusivity for new biologic formulations.
These data exclusivity rights are independent of patent rights-a
pharmaceutical research firm may keep important data secret even if
their patent has already expired, or even if they never actually held a
patent on the product they are researching. 117 This presents an
additional barrier to generic manufacturers, who will now have to
spend time and money duplicating these trials, which could result in
118
a delayed release of their product or a higher market price.
Finally, the TPP incorporated provisions from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which permit
pharmaceutical companies to sue governments that rejected their
evergreening patent applications through an Investor-State Dispute
Resolution mechanism. 119 This means that the TPP could potentially
embed the practice of pharmaceutical evergreening into the
international pharmaceutical
trade. 120 This would permit
pharmaceutical patent-holders to apply for new patents on minor
changes to their existing products, thus extending the patent
monopoly and further delaying the introduction of generics into the
market.
The cumulative result of these changes in international patent
law may also undermine a crucial component of the TRIPS
Agreement called the Doha Declaration, which guaranteed nations
access to essential medicines. Added to the TRIPS Agreement in
November of 2001, the Doha Declaration reads in part:

115.
Id. art. QQ.E.20.
116.
Third World Network, supra note 110, at 6.
117.
See Cox, supra note 81 (discussing the detrimental effects these exclusivity
rights have on competition).
118.
Id.
119.
See Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres, MSF Urges TPP Countries
Not to Abandon Public Health in Bid to Finalize Trade Deal (Feb. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter
MSF Press Release],
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/newsstories/press-release/msf-urges-tpp-countries-not- abandon -public -health-bid-finalize-tr
ade-deal [http://perma.cc/7RTY-2ZSG] (archived Feb. 26, 2015) (discussing potential
negative effects that the TPP may have on public health); see also Barbara Yu Levy,
Dispute Resolution After the TPP Agreement, CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202739910611fDispute-Resolution-After-the-TPP-Tra
de-Agreement?slreturn=20150923130450 [https://perma.cc/VKR8-PB8P] (archived Feb.
13, 2016) (explaining how this dispute resolution system allows investors "to challenge
actions by a host country that are-or appear to be-in violation of their property
rights").
120.
See Flowers, supra note 106 ("[T]he TPP is a major power grab by large
corporations.").
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The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to
in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
use, to the full, the provisions
12 1
flexibility for this purpose.

The Declaration continues that this "flexibility" includes "the
right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted."122 In addition,
"[e]ach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent
123
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency."
The major goal of the Doha Declaration was to allow each
Member state to establish its own, unchallenged regime for
establishing when and how licenses are granted for medicines, as well
as for whether international intellectual property rights are
exhausted at their borders, stating, "These provisions in the
Declaration ensure that governments may issue compulsory licenses
on patents for medicines, or take other steps to protect public
24
health."1
The final draft of the TPP IP chapter actually contained similar
language in its opening section: "Parties may, in formulating or
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Chapter."' 12 5 In addition, a
subsequent section appeared to affirm a commitment to the Doha
Declaration. 126
Despite these apparent affirmations of the signatory nations'
right to protect the public health in their respective state, the TPP's
IP provisions clearly undermine signatory governments' ability to
issue compulsory licenses as guaranteed by the Doha Declaration.
The only exceptions the final draft of the TPP seem to consider are for

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
121.
WTO Doc. WTJMIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746, art. 4 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
122.
Id.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
125.
TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art. QQ.A.Y.1
126.
Id. art. QQ.A.7.1 ('The Parties affirm their commitment to the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.').
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HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs. 1 27 In 2013, Medicins Sans
Frontieres (MSF), a medical aid organization, wrote a letter to
President Obama arguing that the TPP "will roll back public health
128
safeguards and flexibilities enshrined in international law."
In summary, the most important changes that the TPP would
make to the TRIPS-mandated standards are: (i) the ability to
lengthen patent terms for pharmaceutical products, (ii) the relaxation
and expansion of patentability criteria for which countries must grant
drug patents, (iii) the requirement for countries to issue new patents
on minor alterations to a drug, and (iv) the establishment of barriers
on the use of pharmaceutical test data.1 29 Each of these changes will
likely prevent market competition from generic drugs by making it
more difficult for generics to reach market, dismicentivizing the
production of generics in the first place, delaying the rate at which
generics may reach the market, and increasing the cost of
manufacturing generics. 130 Health officials have worried that this
change would primarily affect poor and developing nations that not
only rely on access to cheap medicine but also often deal with
epidemic outbreaks of deadly, but treatable illnesses. 131 Reshma
Ramachandran, a fellow with the American Medical Student
Association, described the TPP as taking "the worst parts of U.S. law,
the parts that make these medications unavailable to patients, and
putting them into a trade policy as a guiding principle for developing
132
countries."
B. PotentialEffects Upon InternationalMedical Regimes
Under the IP provisions of the final leaked draft of the TPP,
countries that currently make use of the TRIPS Agreement guarantee
may lose their ability to issue compulsory licenses for essential
medicines. In addition, pharmaceutical companies will likely be able

127.
TPP Leak 3, supra note 9, art. QQ.A.7. 1(a).
128.
Letter from Dr. Unni Karunakara, Int'l President of M~decins Sans
Frontieres, to Barack Obama, President of the United States (July 15, 2013)
[hereinafter MSF letter], http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/130715TPP%200pen%2OLetterUSA.pdf [http://perma.cc/47W6-B99J] (archived February 26,
2015).
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
See MSF Press Release, supra note 119 ("Make no mistake, in terms of
health, the TPP remains the most damaging trade agreement we've ever seen,
particularly for patients living in middle income countries, where the vast majority of
the world's poor people live.").
Zach Carter, Obama's Global Health Policy Undercuts Reform at Home,
132.
HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/1O/obamas[http://perma.ccBA98-X9YG]
health-policy-global-health-reform n_1659742.html
(archived Feb. 26, 2015).
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to sue governments that challenge their patents. 133 The combination
of these two effects-the diminished ability to issue compulsory
licenses as guaranteed by the Doha Declaration and the ability for
pharmaceutical companies to sue governments that interfere with
their investment in new medical patents-could lead to disastrous
134
effects worldwide, particularly in developing countries.
In particular, the national health services of Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand currently administer a national formulary for
medicines. 135 These formularies are essentially medical boards that
allow the government to reject new drugs from their public health
system because the prices are too high or actually negotiate for lower
prices with the patentees. 136 For example, Australia has what is
called a Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). 137 PBS is able to
regulate the price of medicine domestically, so citizens of Australia
are able to pay one-third to one-tenth the price that Americans pay
for many medicines.1 3 8 Because the TPP would increase the degree of
control that pharmaceutical companies have over how their products
are sold, schemes like the PBS could potentially lose their bargaining
power, leading to the high cost of some medicines being passed down
13 9
to the patient.
Since 1993, New Zealand has utilized a central government
agency called PHARMAC. 140 Since its inception, it has saved New
Zealanders approximately 5 billion NZD. 141 If the TPP passes,
PHARMAC's ability buy cheap generic substitutes would be delayed
and would extend the period during which PHARMAC has to rely on
the original, more expensive version. 14 2 New Zealand's government,
however, has been adamant that PHARMAC's operations are "not up
1 43
for negotiation."'

MSF Press Release supra note 119; Special Rights for Foreign Investors to
133.
Sue Governments, AUSTL. FAIR TRADE & INV. NETWORK, LTD. [hereinafter Special
Rights], http://aftinet.org.au/cms/node/631 [http://perma.ccY65V-AEZL (archived Feb,
26, 2015).
134.
Id.
135.
FERGUSSON, TPP, supra note 2, at 35.
See Carter, supra note 132.
136.
Special Rights, supra note 133.
137.
Id.
138.
See Press Release, Public Health Association, supra note 89 (noting that
139.
the cost would passed down to patients through higher costs for prescriptions).
ROSEMARY WYBER & W. PERRY, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: AN
140.
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON HEALTH IN NEW ZEALAND 7 (2013), http://www.pha.org.nz/
documents/13 1129-tpp-nyes.pdf [https:H/perma.cc/Q4LJ-58HV] (archived Mar. 3, 2016).
Id.
141.
142.
Gordon Campbell, The Neutering of Pharmac-TransPacific Partnership:
How the TPP Trade Deal Means Trouble for Our Drugs Buying Agency, WEREWOLF
(2015), http://werewolf.co.nz/2012/11/tpp-prescribing-for-pharmac/ [http://perma.cc/MQ
2J-7TW7] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
See Daniels, supra note 28.
143.
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As for Canada, Scott Sinclair, a senior research fellow at the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, argued in front of the House
of Commons Standing Committee on International Trade that the
TPP's patent-extension programs would cost the provincial drug
plans approximately two billion CAD annually.1 44 Under the TPP,
practices like these, which allow nations to exercise leverage against
pharmaceutical companies in order to lower the price their consumers
pay for medicines, will likely be banned, or at least harder to
1 45
utilize.
As part of the TPP's Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
regime, which has its origins in NAFTA, foreign investors, including
pharmaceutical companies, can sue governments if they pass a law or
policy that harms their investment, even if that law is passed in the
public interest. 146 For example, in 2014, the American
pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly sued the government of Canada for
500 million dollars because Canada rejected two of its medicine
patents. 147
In the developing world where nations often lack the sort of
healthcare infrastructures discussed above, medicine is often
provided by aid organizations, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres
(Doctor's Without Borders) (MSF). 148 MSF estimates that it delivers
healthcare in nearly seventy countries. 149 MSF has stated that
"[g]eneric competition has proven to be the best way to reduce drug
prices and improve access to treatment." 150 MSF utilizes generic
drugs to treat HIV and AIDS and estimates that the generics have
reduced the cost of treatment by nearly 99 percent. 15 1 Developing
signatory nations that lack the sophisticated medical infrastructure
of Australia, New Zealand, or Canada may risk much more than a
bargaining chip to provide cheaper medicine to its citizens. At stake
here is what MSF considers "a lifeline for people in developing
countries."1 52 Rohit Malpani, the director of policy and analysis at the
MSF Access Campaign, has stated that "[t]he TPP is the most

144.
Scott Sinclair, Senior Research Fellow, Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Opening Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
International Trade (May 27, 2013), https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/
files/uploads/publications/National%200ffice/2013/06/Canada and theTransPacific_
Partnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZL9-9E3B] (archived Feb. 26, 2015).
145.
Id.
146.
Special Rights, supra note 133; MSF Press Release, supra note 119.
147.
MSF Press Release, supra note 119.
148.
MSF Letter, supra note 128.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
MSF Press Release, supra note 119.
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damaging trade agreement we have ever seen in terms of access to
153
medicines for poor people."
C. An Outsider'sApproach to Pharmaceuticals
This subpart will focus on the approach that India has taken
toward pharmaceutical giants by comparing it to that of South
Africa's. In order to provide an example of the types of problems that
developing signatory nations will face if the TPP passes, this subpart
will first discuss the effects of evergreening in South Africa. Next,
this subpart will contrast this approach to the successful approach
that India has taken.
In South Africa, nearly every drug patent is granted, so aid
organizations like MSF often have to spend exorbitant amounts of
their budgets on name-brand pharmaceuticals. 1 54 For example, 20
percent of MSF's entire medical budget is set aside to pay for a single
medication, Pfizer's Linezolid, which is an antibiotic used to treat
individuals with drug-resistant tuberculosis. 155 A generic version of
this medicine actually already exists, but due to South Africa's
generous patent regime, MSF estimates that it will have to continue
paying for the name brand due to Pfizer's ability to evergreen its
56
original patent with secondary patents. 1
India, which is not currently a party to the TPP, has recently
demonstrated how nations might utilize the flexibility embedded in
the TRIPS Agreement. In 2012, the Indian government permitted a
generic cancer drug to be sold for $157 per month, rather than the
$5,000 per month price at which the pioneer drug manufacturer,
Bayer, offered to sell the drug. 157 The Indian government calculated
that during the first years of the drug's availability in India, a mere 2
percent of eligible patients received it due to its high price compared
to the average Indian's income. 15 8 Subsequently, India authorized a
generic manufacturer based in India, Natco Pharma, to begin selling
the generic version of the drug, offering Bayer a 6 percent royalty on
all sales.159 Despite the fact that the right to engage in this type of
compulsory licensing is expressly guaranteed by the TRIPS
Agreement, in 2012, Deputy Director Teresa Rea of the USPTO
testified before Congress that the United States wanted to "stop the
granting of further compulsory licenses."'160 The USTR did not go as

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carter, supra note 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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far as the Deputy Director did but "expressed concern with India's
interpretation of its law in authorizing the issuance of this
16 1
license."
In summary, the TPP contains IP provisions that will
tremendously benefit pharmaceutical companies, while putting
tremendous pressure on both the national health-care systems of
developed signatory nations and the aid organizations that serve a
similar role in developing signatory nations to keep up with
increasing prices of name-brand pharmaceuticals and diminished
availability of generic alternatives. The next Part will propose an
alternative set of IP provisions, based in part on the current
formulary systems of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, as well as
on the compulsory license approach that India took in dealing with
Bayer. The resulting regime is an attempted compromise between
national health-care systems and pharmaceutical companies,
whereby citizens are still able to receive certain essential medicines
at reasonable prices, while pharmaceutical companies may continue
to receive royalties in order to reward them for their tremendously
high research and development investments.

IV. SOLUTION
There is a pressing need for a paradigm shift in the way pharmaceuticals are
researched and developed, and how intellectual property is applied to
medicines as global public goods. Governments should introduce global norms
which delink drug development and price. MSF believes this is essential to
closing the gap in access to medicines for millions of people around the world by
promoting both innovation and access.
-Medicins

Sans Frontieres

162

Consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, this Note proposes that access to certain life-saving
medications should be considered a fundamental human right and
16 3
poses an alternate mechanism by which to achieve this.
Commensurate with the notion of life as a human right,
governments should not have to choose between providing that right
to its citizens and a potentially lucrative free-trade agreement with a
major economic power. It is a false choice, and this Note proposes a
mechanism that could be incorporated into an amended version of the
TPP that would not only reaffirm the flexibility that the TRIPS

Id.
161.
162.
MSF Letter, supra note 128.
163.
Foreclosure Relief and Extension for Service Members Act of 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-286, 128 Stat. 3093 (2014) USCS International Rights, Part III, Article 6 (PL
113-286, approved 12/18/14).
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Agreement promised to its member states but also provide a
framework for ensuring that adequate financial incentives remain in
place for major pharmaceuticals to make the tremendous investment
required for medical breakthroughs.
This Part begins by proposing a mechanism that would permit
each signatory nation to create a list of National Essential Medicines
and a Board that would regulate this list. Next, this Part will
describe and analyze benefits and drawbacks to this mechanism as
compared to the TPP as it stands.
A. The NationalEssential Medicines List
First, the TPP should incorporate an option for each signatory
government to create a "Board of Essential Medicines." 164 This Board
could either exist as an agency of that state's pre-existing medical
formulary, or be created separately upon entering into the TPP. Upon
signing the TPP, each government's Board of Essential Medicines
should be tasked with studying and identifying the most dire medical
issues faced in their nation and should create a list of essential
medicines that are specifically exempt from international patent
rules. 165 These medicines would be those that the government
specifically determines are most effective at treating life-threatening
or terminal diseases and are intended to be available in a country's
health system at all times. 16 6 This list may be updated on a regular
basis or in the case of a national health emergency, such as an
outbreak. 167 The standard for this list should include pharmaceutical
compounds that successfully treat, manage, cure, or prevent the most
prevalent and dangerous preventable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, smallpox, and measles.
Because different countries face different geographic and
immunological obstacles, each nation needs to be able to cater its
essential medicines list to the needs of its own particular population.
These medicines would include antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, or

164.

See, e.g., THE SELECTION AND USE OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES,

WHO

TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 914 (World Health Organization, 2002) [hereinafter WHO],
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4875e/s4875e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CLU-JGN2]
(archived Feb. 2, 2016) (illustrating an example of a "Model List of Essential Drugs").
See, e.g., id. § 3.3.3.
165.
166.
Id.
167.
See, e.g., Fast-TrackingTreatments: The Hunt for Ebola Medicines Is Being
Accelerated, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Fast-Tracking Treatments],
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21616888-hunt-ebola-medicine
s-bein g-accelerated-fast-tracking-treatments [perma.cc/JS9S-4K5D] (archived Feb. 2,
2016).
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other pharmaceutical methods, as long as they have high success
16 8
rates associated with treating diseases with high mortality rates.
Once the list is created, the pioneer drug manufacturers will
have two options. The first option would involve the pharmaceutical
company granting licenses to each nation that includes the medicine
on its essential medicine list. This license would permit the relevant
Board of Essential Medicines to purchase the medication directly at a
lower price, which they would then resell to its citizens at no profit.
The pharmaceutical company would receive less money for its sales
but would retain all of its original monopoly rights.
The second option would involve the pharmaceutical company
freely providing its research and test data to the country directly. The
country's government may then commission the manufacture of a
generic alternative, the sales of which would result in a reasonable
royalty to be paid back to the pioneer drug company.169 In exchange
for providing the information that would permit the signatory to
develop a generic alternative, the pioneer would continue to be able to
sell its name-brand version at its original price in that state.
This dual regime would permit each nation to either purchase
and resell a name-brand medication directly at a low cost, or produce
a low-cost generic alternative itself and pay a royalty back to the
pioneer. In either arrangement, the original patentee would receive
compensation for its tremendous research and development costs.
In terms of specific TPP provisions as they currently stand, this
bargain would require other benefits for the pharmaceutical
companies in order to justify the diminished profits that would result
from either option. First, pharmaceutical patentees would need to
continue to have the ability to evergreen all of their drug patents with
secondary or continuation patents. In addition, signatory states
would continue to have the option of granting a five-year extension to
drug companies on their pharmaceutical patents. Regarding the fiveyear monopoly that pharmaceutical companies will have on their
research and testing data, pioneer producers would retain that
monopoly in all instances except those relating to essential medicines,
in which case the monopoly right would be contingent upon whether
they chose to issue a license or permit signatory nations to produce
the generic alternative. If they simply issue a license so that the
Board of Essential Medicines could purchase the name-brand
medication at a lower price, then they would retain the data
monopoly right. If, however, they would prefer to allow signatory

168.
See generally WHO, supra note 164, at 38 (noting that the World Health
Organization's Model list "aims to identify cost-effective medicines for priority
conditions, together with the reasons for their inclusion, linked to evidence-based
clinical guidelines and with special emphasis on public health aspects and
considerations of value for money.").
169.
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 132.

2016!

THE TPP: THE DEATH-KNELL OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS?

879

nations the opportunity to produce generics themselves, then they
would have to share that information with the relevant generic
producer. 170
In instances in which the pharmaceutical company opts to share
the data and allow for generic production of their drug, each
government could choose how that generic is produced, depending on
the degree of state control in that nation. States may produce the
medicine at a state-owned manufacturing facility, or they may award
a domestic generic manufacturer or manufacturers the license, as
171
India did with Natco Pharma and the Bayer anti-cancer drug.
Nations would also have the option to permit multiple private
manufacturers to bid on the right to produce the generic, in the same
way other sectors make use of various private entities bidding on
government contracts in order to secure the lowest price.
In order to determine the appropriate name-brand price or
royalty associated with the generic sale, the Board of Essential
Medicines would be able to negotiate with the pioneer drug company
to find an appropriate price. The maximum price that the Board of
Essential Medicines would resell the name-brand medication would
be capped at 50 percent of the domestic sale price (e.g., the price an
American manufacturer sells its name brand drug in the United
States). Regarding the generic regime, the pioneer manufacturer
could sell its name-brand product at its market value to customers
that prefer and can afford the name-brand version, and the generic
manufacturer would pay a royalty to be negotiated by the Board of
172
Essential Medicines, with a minimum royalty of 6 percent.

170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Carter, supra note 132. This 6 percent starting point is based upon the
royalty that Natco Pharma paid to Bayer in India.
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In addition, each time a pioneer updates or attempts to
evergreen its patent, the Board of Essential Medicines would have
the right to renegotiate on a case-by-case basis as to whether the new
version of the drug was sufficiently useful for the Board to invest in
or add it to its list of essential medicines. 173 This way, the namebrand drugs should still be available to consumers that prefer to pay
the premium. The resulting generics would compete with those namebrand drugs.

See WHO, supra note 164, § 3.3.3 (highlighting the selection criteria of the
173.
World Health Organization).
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B. Projected Benefits of the ProposedAlternative
Each signatory party considering ratifying the TPP is currently
faced with a decision: either maintain its current access to national
health care, compulsory licensing, and cheap generics, or implement a
global trade agreement that could potentially increase its GDP. This
is a false choice, and the goal of this proposed regime is to permit TPP
signatories to have it both ways. These countries should be free to
engage in this free trade agreement while maintaining a position that
74
affordable health care is a human right.'
The goal of this scheme is to promote international
pharmaceutical trade, innovation, manufacturing, and global access
to affordable life-saving medicines. Under the current TRIPS
Agreement scheme, compulsory licenses to produce cheap generics
are available to signatories. 175 Under the proposed scheme, either
compulsory licenses would be granted automatically or test data
would be freely disseminated, permitting cheap dispersal of namebrand medications, rapid and cost-effective domestic production, and
allowing for the availability of generic versions of essential medicines.
Global health crises could be dealt with much more quickly and with
greater effectiveness if obstacles to the production of useful generics
176
were removed.
This plan also permits pharmaceutical companies to retain their
incentives to invest in new medicines. By limiting the essential
medicines list to a targeted set of specific illnesses or outbreaks,
rather than taking a blanket approach to all medications,
pharmaceutical companies' interests will suffer as little harm as
possible. Pioneer pharmaceutical companies will be able to benefit at
all tiers of medical sales and will have the ability to retain all the
expanded rights proposed under the TPP.
While the generic versions will admittedly earn the pioneer a
mere percentage of a lower price, the sheer number of sales that take
place should make a tremendous difference toward helping the
pioneer recoup its research and development cost. To use the example
of Bayer and India-Bayer sold its name-brand product at roughly
$5,000 per month and was only able to reach 2 percent of eligible
Indian customers. 177 Under the current regime, that would be the

174.
See MSF Letter, supra note 128 (arguing that governments should
introduce global norms that delink drug development and price because 'WMSF believes
this is essential to closing the gap in access to medicines for millions of people around
the world by promoting both innovation and access").
175.
Doha Declaration, supra note 121.
176.
See Fast-tracking Treatments, supra note 167 (explaining that the strategy
endorsed by the WHO which concluded that, provided certain conditions are met, it
would be ethical to offer unproven, experimental treatments or methods to prevent
infection).
177.
Carter, supra note 132.
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only price available for the first several years, and depending on the
standard of living of the consumer, Bayer might never expand beyond
2 percent of its potential market. Under the regime described above,
Bayer would be able to earn money from the other 98 percent of the
market. While the amount of money Bayer would earn would be
relatively little, it would still be more than what it would earn had it
never accessed that market in the first place. An analogy would be
the approach that airlines take when selling seats at different prices.
If airlines only sold first class tickets, they would make a lot of money
from relatively few customers. By selling coach tickets at a discounted
rate, they are able to make more money by reaching a broader
market, even if the additional money only amounts to a fraction of the
premium-tier profit.
An additional benefit is that this plan does not disturb the
decreased patentability standards under the TPP, the potential for
evergreening, or the five-year extension option for pharmaceutical
patents. The overarching goal is to promote cheap access to a specific
set of essential medicines, not to prevent pharmaceutical companies
from making money. Permitting these pharmaceutical companies to
maintain tighter control over their intellectual property while
providing a clear pathway for specific medications to become readily
available is a reasonable trade-off.
Perhaps the most obvious benefit is what this plan will provide
to the citizens of TPP signatory nations. A healthy workforce is a
productive workforce, and by making life-saving medications widely
available, each nation will decrease the tax burden allocated to
health-care costs and will have a population that will keep up in
178
productivity in the twenty-first century.
C. ProjectedDownsides of ProposedAlternative
This plan is far from perfect. Many major pharmaceutical
companies in the world are headquartered in the United States and
comprise a major sector of the American economy. 179 Permitting
these companies to share in the profits earned from their
astronomically expensive investment in developing their products
could positively affect their incentive to discover and produce new

178.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORKPLACE HEALTH PROMOTION,
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, http://www.who.int/occupational health/topics/workplace/en
indexl.html [http://perma.cc/D6TK-8MXY] (archived Feb, 2, 2016).
179.
See, e.g., PMLIVE, TOP 25 PHARMA COMPANIES BY GLOBAL SALES (2014),
http://www.pmlive.com/top_pharma-list/global-revenues [http://perma.cc/97R2-ALUD]
(archived Feb. 2, 2016); see also PHRMA, THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY HELPS
STRENGTHEN THE U.S. ECONOMY [hereinafter The Biopharmaceutical Industry],
http://www.phrma.org/economic-impact [perma.cc/4C7P-CNU8] (archived Feb. 2, 2016).
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medicines. 180 Furthermore, the success of this plan will depend on
the widespread sale of the pharmaceutical products. The more
successful the products, the more attractive this plan would be to
pioneers. Without substantial guarantees that they would be able to
recoup a substantial portion of their investment, it is unlikely
pharmaceutical companies would support this plan. This proposed
plan to increase access to medicines worldwide could ironically result
in the diminished production of new medicines in the future without
additional domestic economic incentives to continue research and
development. 181
For the foregoing reasons, it is unlikely that the United States
would ever adopt this scheme. Because the United States was the
dominant negotiating party in the TPP, a lack of U.S. support for a
major modification such as this would smother any chance of its
adoption. Pharmaceutical companies are major donors to political
campaigns and are suspected of being advisors to the USTR. 182 Based
on its participation in the actual TPP negotiations and the comments
made by the USTR Deputy Director regarding India's exercising its
right to take a compulsory license, it appears that the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry is hostile to any policy that would loosen its
grip on its intellectual property, even if in a specific and limited
way. 18 3 The combination of the pharmaceutical industry's hostility
and influence in U.S. politics would hamper the United States' ability
to engage in any future negotiations that would open pharmaceutical
companies up to greater competition, even if any current or future
administration were to actually accept this proposal.
The most severe drawback to this plan is how limited in scope it
is. For this plan to have any practical chance of survival, however, it
must be limited to a small subset of essential medicines, rather than
opening up each pharmaceutical company's entire inventory of
products to becoming available as generics.
Despite
the
obstacles,
recent
developments
regarding
international medical crises have revealed the potential for the
international community to come together and address medical
necessities as they arise, potentially paving the way for a mechanism
18 4
like this in the future.

180.
See The Biopharmaceutical Industry, supra note 179 (noting the
importance of a "vibrant and strong" biopharmaceutical industry).
181.
See, e.g., id.
182.
See Letter from Joseph Stiglitz, supra note 87.
183.
Carter, supra note 132.
184.
See Fast-Tracking Treatments, supra note 167 (observing, using Ebola
containment as an example, that "scientists and health officials will have to bypass
many of the existing rules that govern the delivery of new drugs, and develop potential
remedies with unprecedented speed.").
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V. CONCLUSION

The TPP is the largest free-trade agreement that the United
States has ever joined, and it will have massive repercussions for all
parties involved, particularly regarding the availability of cheap,
generic medications. 185 The TRIPS Agreement has guaranteed access
to medication since the Doha Declaration of 2001, and unfortunately,
186
the TPP will almost certainly end up undermining that guarantee.
If instead the negotiators adopted a plan that recognized lifesaving medication as a human right, the Doha Declaration would
continue as a bedrock guarantee that signatories would continue to
have access to medications that could dramatically improve the
health of their domestic workforces and would permit each nation to
fully reap the other economic benefits the TPP offers. By limiting the
essential medicine lists to a select few truly necessary medications,
the TPP would not alienate pharmaceutical companies, as they would
continue to benefit from their normal repertoire of products and
would continue to receive strong protection of their intellectual
property. They would also maintain the incentive to continue to
invent and create world-changing medical products. As it currently
stands, the influence that pharmaceutical companies have had on the
negotiations indicates that global health will suffer if the TPP is
passed. This need not be so; there is a better way of moving forward.
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